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** The phrase comes from Johnny Cochran's closing argument in the O.J. Simpson
murder trial. Cochran actually said, "if it doesn't fit, you must acquit."
CNN.com, If it Doesn't Fit, You Must Acquit, www.cnn.com/US/OJ/daily/9-27/
8pm! (last visited March 11, 2008). However, by the time of Cochran's death in
2005, the statement in popular culture had morphed into the ungrammatical: "If
the glove don't fit, you must acquit." See, e.g., The BoxHeads.net, If the Glove
Don't Fit, You Must Acquit, www.theboxheads.net/modules.php?name=News&
file=print&sid=90 (last visited March 11, 2008). The widely-perceived failure of
the prosecution's in-court experiment may have played a role in Simpson's
acquittal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael,1 more forensic
experts than ever in scientific and technical fields are testing the theo-
ries about which they testify in major litigation. The admissibility of
testing or "experimental" evidence is often crucial. The stakes are
high. The cost of conducting proper testing can be considerable, but
the cost of losing the case if a party fails to test (or if the court ex-
cludes the test) is enormous. In large measure, the jury's verdict may
rest on demonstrative evidence offered to persuade jurors by helping
them understand the testing performed by the experts and its signifi-
cance to the issues in dispute. If the court excludes the testing evi-
dence in whole or in part, the proponent's case may be doomed. The
stakes are equally great for the opponent of such evidence. If the
stakes are higher than ever, so is the frequency with which the admis-
sibility of evidence of testing is the decisive issue in the case. This is
partly because of the effect of Kumho, but it is also due to the increas-
ing sophistication of forensic testing and demonstrative evidence.
Although many of the leading cases arise in automotive product
liability cases, the issue transcends that area of civil litigation and
encompasses a broad range of cases. Given its importance, one might
expect that the rules of evidence would provide clear criteria gov-
erning the admissibility of experimental and demonstrative evidence.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Muth v. Ford Motor Co.2 illustrates persis-
tent problems with federal courts' treatment of experimental evidence.
As a result of the Kumho decision and the subsequent revisions to
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter "Federal
Rules"), 3 experts typically are required to test their hypotheses if pos-
1. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
2. 461 F.3d 557, 565-67 (5th Cir. 2006).
3. Rule 702 states:
Testimony by Experts.
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sible, to conduct the test in accordance with the rigors of their profes-
sion, and to apply the results reliably to the facts. But, if evidence of
tests satisfying those requirements is offered at trial, courts continue
to rule unpredictably on the admissibility of those tests.4
In civil litigation, unpredictability is an equal opportunity source of
frustration for plaintiffs and defendants alike. The unsuccessful pro-
ponent of excluded evidence may be a plaintiff- or a defendant. 6 Like-
wise, the unsuccessful opponent of admitted evidence may be either a
plaintiff or a defendant. 7
There is one principal reason for the current state of unpredictabil-
ity. Courts continue to treat experimental evidence as a discrete cate-
gory of evidence, the admissibility of which is judged by a nebulous
substantial similarity standard that predates the Federal Rules and
no longer serves a useful purpose. Worse yet, the courts have ex-
tended the same substantial similarity standard to demonstrative evi-
dence, with no serious consideration of the appropriateness of doing
SO.
Rigorous application of the Federal Rules would ensure that exper-
imental evidence is reliable and relevant (as required by Rules 702
and 401) and that risks of unfair prejudice do not outweigh that evi-
dence's relevance (as required by Rule 403). 8 When courts respect the
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if
(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
4. See, e.g., Shipp v. Gen. Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985) (addressing the
trial court's admission of plaintiffs evidence and exclusion of defendant's similar
evidence). Also compare Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557 (5th Cir. 2006)
with Harvey v. General Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989) (reaching
diametrically opposed conclusions on the admissibility of the same test in the
same kind of products liability case).
5. See, e.g., Jodoin v. Toyota Motor Corp., 284 F.3d 272 (1st Cir. 2002); Finchum v.
Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1995).
6. See, e.g., Muth, 461 F.3d 557.
7. See McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396 (8th Cir. 1994); Frazier v.
Honeywell Intern., Inc., No. 2-05CV548, 2007 WL 2908476 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 3,
2007) (defendant); Harvey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989)
(plaintiff).
8. Rule 403 provides:
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confu-
sion, or Waste of Time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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constraints that now exist under these, and other, Federal Rules, the
imprecise substantial similarity standard from the past becomes un-
necessary. Continued use of the substantial similarity standard in-
jects needless confusion and imprecision into evidentiary decision
making. Although similarities and dissimilarities between test condi-
tions and accident conditions are a pertinent factor in assessing the
reliability, relevance, and prejudicial impact of tests conducted by ex-
perts, the old substantial similarity standard for determining the ad-
missibility of such evidence distracts litigants and courts from more
refined criteria that ought to be explicitly considered. There is no
longer any need to treat experimental evidence as a discrete category
of evidence law governed by antiquated standards of admissibility.
Nor should the substantial similarity standard govern the admissi-
bility of demonstrative evidence. Demonstrative evidence is simply
not the same thing as experimental evidence. Rule 401 ought to be
understood to provide, or amended to make explicit, that "relevant evi-
dence" includes evidence that fairly and accurately explains, illus-
trates, or clarifies other admissible evidence. With such a
clarification, Rule 403 and the other Federal Rules provide a more
suitable framework for judging the admissibility of demonstrative evi-
dence that flows from testing than the old substantial similarity
standard.
An expert's test should not be required to be "substantially similar"
to be admissible. Rather, it ought to be reliable within the meaning of
Rule 702 and be probative of the hypothesis it was intended to prove
or disprove. Nor should demonstrative evidence be treated under a
substantial similarity standard. Muth is not the first case to have
stumbled into this thicket. We would all be better off if it were the
last. It is time to give the substantial similarity standard a decent
burial.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Muth Decision
Muth v. Ford Motor Co. 9 demonstrates the shortcomings of the
substantial similarity standard. In Muth, an automobile passenger
sustained a spinal cord injury resulting in quadriplegia in a rollover of
the Ford Crown Victoria in which he was riding.'O The plaintiff
brought a product liability claim against Ford, contending that the ve-
hicle's roof was insufficiently strong, and that the plaintiff was injured
as a result of the roof crush."1 Ford asserted that a stronger roof
would not have prevented head and neck injuries in rollover accidents
9. 461 F.3d 557 (5th Cir. 2006).
10. Id. at 560.
11. Id.
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because, during the rollover event, even a restrained occupant's head
drops as much as five inches toward the ground and that the spinal
cord injury occurs before the roof crush occurs. 12 Ford offered demon-
strative evidence from both the Malibu tests and the Controlled Rol-
lover Impact System ("CRIS") test, to illustrate Ford's contention that
a stronger roof would do little, if anything, to prevent injuries in rol-
lover accidents.13
1. The Malibu and CRIS Tests
Although numerous scientific publications have addressed the role
of roof strength in protecting occupants in rollover collisions, and de-
spite years of test development, it has been extremely difficult to de-
velop a repeatable dynamic rollover test method. 14 This is a major
reason why the National Highway and Traffic Administration's
("NHTSA") regulatory standard continues to specify a static, rather
than dynamic, test for roof strength.15 Repeatability is difficult be-
cause a motor vehicle rolling over is somewhat analogous to tossing a
football onto the ground-no one can predict with certainty where it
will bounce. The Malibu and Controlled Rollover Impact System
("CRIS") tests are two of the foremost dynamic evaluations of occupant
kinematics in rollover accidents.
General Motors designed the Malibu tests in the early 1980s.16
GM conducted two series of full-scale rollover crash tests at the Gen-
eral Motors Proving Grounds. The first series used unrestrained in-
strumented anthropomorphic dummies in 1983 Chevrolet Malibus. 17
The primary expressed purpose was "to investigate the conditions
leading to injuries in rollover conditions and the effect of roof strength
12. Id. at 560-61.
13. Id. at 561.
14. E. A. Moffatt, E. R. Cooper, J. J. Croteau, K. F. Orlowski, D. R. Marth & J. W.
Carter, Matched-Pair Rollover Impacts of Rollcaged Production Roof Cars Using
the Controlled Rollover Impact System (CRIS), in SAE TECHNICAL PAPER SERIES
(SAE Technical Paper Series No. 2003-01-0172, 2003).
15. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.116 (2006) (com-
monly referred to as Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 216);
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg.
49223, 49240 (Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
16. Muth, 461 F.3d at 565.
17. Kenneth F. Orlowski, R.Thomas Bundorf & Edward A. Moffatt, Rollover Crash
Tests-The Influence of Roof Strength on Injury Mechanics, in SAE TECHNICAL
PAPER SERIES, at 182 (SAE Technical Paper Series No. 851734, 1985) (hereinafter
"Malibu I"]. These tests are also discussed in Muth, 461 F.3d at 561 and Harvey
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1355 (10th Cir. 1989).
2008]
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in preventing injuries."' 8 GM subsequently ran a second series of
tests using belted dummies.19 In both series, test films depicted
Malibu sedans on a "cradle" being pushed sideways down a track. The cars
were "launched" when they reached the end of the track at a speed of 32
m.p.h. The high-speed photos show the roll sequence from various vantage
points, and also the two front seat dummies from a camera mounted in the
back seat.2
0
Figure 1, below, illustrates the layout of the test.
Figure 1: Malibu Tests
(Figure 1 is reprinted with permission from SAE Paper 902314 ©1990 SAE
International)
The tests measured loads imposed on instrumented dummies and
compared the results between production vehicles and vehicles modi-
fied to make the roof rigid.2 1 As illustrated by Figure 2, below, in both
series of tests, the peak neck load occurred at the beginning of the
collision before any significant roof deformation had occurred. 22 In-
18. Malibu I, supra note 17, at 185.
19. G. S. Bahling, R. T. Bundorf, G. S. Kaspzyk, E. A. Moffatt, K. F. Orloski & J. E.
Stocke, Rollover and Drop Tests-The Influence of Roof Strength on Injury
Mechanics Using Belted Dummies, in SAE TECHNICAL PAPER SERIES, at 102 (SAE
Technical Paper Series No. 902314, 1990) [hereinafter "Malibu II"].
20. Harvey v, Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1355 (10th Cir. 1989).
21. Malibu I, supra note 17, at 182; Malibu II, supra note 19, at 103.
22. Malibu I, supra note 17, at 192; Malibu II, supra note 19, at 106; see also Michael
B. James, Ronald P. Nordhagen, Dennis C. Schneider, Sung-Woo Koh, Occupant
Injury in Rollover Crashes: A Re-Examination of Malibu II, in SAE TECHNICAL
PAPER SERIES (SAE Technical Paper Series No. 2007-01-0369, 2007).
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creasing the roofs rigidity did not significantly reduce the dummies'
neck loads.2 3 Both series of tests led to the authors' conclusion that
[r]oof crush simply reflects the magnitude and location of the impact of the
roof with the ground. The harder the hit, the greater the deformation and the
greater the potential for injury. Increasing the roof strength will reduce defor-
mation but it will not reduce neck loading when the occupant is at the point of
impact.2 4
Figure 2: Timing of Peak Neck Load and Roof Crush
14d
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(Figure 2 is reprinted with permission from SAE Paper 902314 ©1990 SAE
International)
The CRIS test, conducted by Exponent, Inc., during 2000-2001, was
developed in response to the NHTSA's request for comments on Fed-
eral Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 216, which establishes a static
strength standard for automobile roofs. 25 The CRIS test improved on
the Malibu tests by controlling "the position, momentum, and point of
impact of the vehicle's first contact with the ground."2 6 The CRIS test
released a rotating vehicle in a precise manner onto the ground from
the back of a moving semi-trailer. "By controlling the roll, pitch and
yaw angles, translation and vertical velocities, and roll velocity of the
23. Malibu I, supra note 17, at 192; Malibu II, supra note 19, at 106.
24. Garry S. Bahling, R. Thomas Bundorf, Edward A. Moffatt & Kenneth F. Orlow-
ski, The Influence of Increased Roof Strength on Belted and Unbelted Dummies in
Rollover and Drop Tests, 38 J. TRAuMA: INJ., INFECTION, & CRITICAL CARE 557,
557 (1995).
25. Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F. 3d 557, 566 (5th Cir. 2006); Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.216 (2006). See Moffatt et al., supra note 14;
Jarrod W. Carter, John L. Habberstad & Jeffrey Croteau, A Comparison of the
Controlled Rollover Impact System (CRIS) with the J2114 Rollover Dolly, in SAE
TECHNICAL PAPER SERIES (SAE Technical Paper Series No. 2002-01-0694, 2002).
26. Muth, 461 F. 3d at 566.
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vehicle, the first roof-to-ground interaction was repeatable from test to
test."27
NHTSA did not adopt CRIS (or any other dynamic test protocol)
when it last revised the federal safety standards in 2001 because the
vehicle's motion after first contact with the ground was not suffi-
ciently repeatable; however, the agency acknowledged that the CRIS
test was "helpful in understanding occupant kinematics during rol-
lover crashes."28
Figure 3: Schematic Diagram of the CRIS
TractorTruss Arms
(Figure 3 is reprinted with permission from SAE Paper 2003-01-0172 02003 SAE
International)
Like the Malibu tests, the CRIS tests compared matched pairs of
vehicles: 1998-2000 Ford Crown Victorias, one a production vehicle
and the other equipped with a roll cage.29 As with the Malibu tests,
the peak neck axial loads measured on instrumented dummies were
nearly identical in the roll-caged and production vehicles.3 0 Moreover,
as with the Malibu tests, the peak head accelerations and neck loads
occurred before any significant roof deformation.31 The authors con-
cluded that roof deformation "does not affect injury potential for
belted occupants whose heads are at or near the roof at the time and
location of roof-to-ground impact."3 2
2. The Fifth Circuit's Decision on Admissibility
In Muth, Ford offered both tests to show that spinal cord injuries
in rollover accidents are not caused by roof crush and to assist the jury
in understanding Ford's experts' testimony regarding the general dy-
27. Clifford C. Chou, Robert W. McCoy & Jialiang Le, A Literature Review of Rollover
Test Methodologies, 1 INT'L J. VEHICLE SAFETY 200, 203 (2005).
28. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg.
49223, 49240 (Aug. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
29. Moffatt et al., supra note 14.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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namic characteristics of rollover accidents. 33 The trial court permit-
ted the experts to testify but excluded demonstrative evidence of the
tests, including film and photographs. It excluded the test films be-
cause it concluded that the tests were not conducted under substan-
tially the same conditions as those involved in the lawsuit.3 4
Ford appealed a judgment for the plaintiff, but the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. Writing for the court, Judge Higginbotham recited the rule
that when "demonstrative evidence is offered only as an illustration of
general scientific principles, 3 5 not as a re-enactment of disputed
events, it need not pass the substantial similarity standard."36 The
circuit court cautioned, however, that such demonstrative evidence
must not be misleading in and of itself.3 7 A demonstration might mis-
lead when it resembles the disputed accident, but, the court observed,
this resemblance gives rise to the requirement of substantial similar-
ity.3 8 The Fifth Circuit ruled that the trial court had the discretion to
determine that the demonstrative evidence was not quite similar
enough, yet too closely resembled the disputed accident, to present ab-
stract principles effectively without misleading the jury.39
Ford claimed that the CRIS test was not offered as a re-enactment
but only to show general scientific principles.40 The conditions of the
CRIS test closely resembled Ford's theory of the accident as presented
by its reconstructionist, but were sharply at odds with the reconstruc-
tion evidence offered by plaintiffs.41 Given this fact, the trial court
exercised its discretion to reject the video as not being merely a pres-
entation of general scientific principles while permitting Ford's expert
witnesses to testify at length to their conclusions, limiting only their
reliance upon "visual aids."4 2 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's exclusion of the test videos and photographs.
B. Origins of the Substantial Similarity Standard
The Fifth Circuit opinion in Muth provides no indication that the
parties or the court ever questioned the rationale of applying a sub-
33. 461 F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 2006).
34. Id.
35. See Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 401-02 (10th Cir. 1993); Four Corners
Helicopters, Inc. v. Turbomecca, S.A., 979 F. 2d 1434, 1441 (10th Cir. 1992);
Swajian v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 F.2d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 1990) (disallowing admis-
sion of videotaped tests because defendant "fail [ed] to mention even one such gen-
eral scientific principle that the videotapes purport[ed] to demonstrate").
36. Muth, 461 F.3d at 566.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 566-67.
40. Id.
41. Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 567 (5th Cir. 2006).
42. Id.
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stantial similarity standard to determine the admissibility of demon-
strative evidence of tests that "re-enact" the accident. However, such
a standard is found nowhere in the Federal Rules or their comments.
It predates both Daubert4 3 and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Not
surprisingly, the rule's origins are unrelated to existing standards for
admissibility of expert testimony. Rather, a century before the codifi-
cation of the Federal Rules, common law decisions addressed the ad-
missibility of "experimental evidence."44 Thereafter, as seen below,
courts began to treat experimental evidence as a discrete category and
used a substantial similarity standard to determine its admissibility.
Moreover, the standard governed the admissibility of evidence of the
experiment itself rather than demonstrative evidence illustrating or
depicting the experiment.
1. Pre-Federal Rules Cases
In one early example of "experimental evidence," May Department
Stores Co. v. Runge,4 5 the plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury
when a 200-pound "truck" fell down an elevator shaft and landed on
him.46 The principal issue at trial was whether the truck had some-
how passed through a gate on an upper floor of the building.47 The
parties disputed whether there had been sufficient clearance below
the gate for the truck to pass through. 48 The gate was raised and low-
ered by a rope.4 9 Plaintiff claimed that the rope "had been broken and
retied several weeks before the accident and had thereby been made
so short that it would not allow" the gate to descend sufficiently to
block access to the elevator shaft and that the rope and the gate had
been in this condition for at least two or three weeks prior to the
accident.5o
The defendant disputed this, claiming that the truck was probably
in the elevator shaft when the plaintiff used the elevator. 5 1 It offered
the testimony of fact witnesses who, after the accident, attempted to
raise the gate as high as it could go. 5 2 They tied the rope so that the
gate would be raised as high as possible, consistent with the auto-
matic operation of the elevator.53 Then they tried to push a truck of
the same dimensions as the truck that injured the plaintiff under the
43. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
44. Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401 (1872).
45. 241 F. 575 (8th Cir. 1917).
46. Id. at 576-77.
47. Id. at 577.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Runge, 241 F. 575, 577 (8th Cir. 1917).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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gate into the elevator shaft.5 4 They found that it was impossible to do
so.5 5 The trial court rejected defendant's evidence as "self-serving,"
but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 5 6 The appellate
court concluded that the evidence was no more self-serving than other
evidence offered by the plaintiff and that it was admissible as experi-
mental evidence, stating:
If the question were whether or not at a time past an article of furniture
passed through a specific door or window, whether or not a ladder reached the
top of a pile of lumber or of a house, whether or not a rope was long enough to
reach between two fixed objects, and the testimony of witnesses was conflict-
ing, subsequent actual tests would be competent, relevant, and convincing evi-
dence of the fact. To the common mind such evidence is even more persuasive
and convincing than the testimony of witnesses who casually looked at the
articles in some past time.5 7
Citing the 1872 decision of Darling v. Westmoreland,58 the court
concluded that such evidence was admissible if it "substantially tends
to establish the fact it is offered to prove."59 May Stores cited older
cases holding that tests could be competent evidence if the conditions
of the tests were the same as those of the plaintiffs accident "as near
as practicable."60 Where it is
doubtful whether or not it has such a tendency on account of its remoteness in
time, place, or otherwise, and where it is likely to tend more to confusion and
inconvenience than to justice and certainty, it is discretionary with the trial
court to limit the extent to which it may be received.
6 1
Notably, like many of the early cases, May Stores had nothing to do
with expert witness testimony, as the witnesses who conducted the
tests were not experts. Nor was there any attempt to present the ex-
periment to the jury via demonstrative evidence.
The court in May Stores did not explicitly adopt a "substantial sim-
ilarity" standard for the admissibility of the experiment. Its require-
ment that the conditions of the tests be the same as those of the
subject accident "as near as practicable" is susceptible to a different
interpretation, based on the practicality of achieving greater similar-
ity rather than the extent of the dissimilarities. Moreover, May Stores
treated the relevancy of the experiment as an integral element of the
admissibility determination, given the court's statements that the evi-
dence must be probative ("substantially tends to establish the fact it is
offered to prove")62 and not unfairly prejudicial ("where it is likely to
54. Id. at 577-78.
55. May Dep't Stores Co. v. Runge, 241 F. 575, 578 (8th Cir. 1917).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 578.
58. Id. at 578-79 (quoting Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 405 (N.H. 1872)).
59. Id. at 579.
60. Byers v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 29 S.W. 128, 130 (Tenn. 1895).
61. May, 241 F. at 578.
62. Id. at 579.
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tend more to confusion and inconvenience than to justice and cer-
tainty").6 3 However, other cases predating May Stores applied a stan-
dard more akin to substantial similarity. In Tackman v. Brotherhood
of American Yeomen, 6 4 for example, the Court concluded:
[I]t is now well settled that, when the conditions are shown to be substantially
the same, evidence of actual experiment is an acceptable aid in determining
the issues in a case. Indeed, there is an advantage in experiments over some
other kinds of evidence, in that it [sic] substitutes experience for speculation
and a demonstration in place of what sometimes seems no more than guess-
work .... [but] the conditions must be such that they may be found to have
been not only possible, but reasonably probable .... 65
Courts continued to apply a substantial similarity standard for the
admission of experimental evidence thereafter without focusing on
whether the evidence was presented through fact witnesses or ex-
perts.6 6 More recently, but still decades before adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals applied such a standard
to decide the admissibility of an expert's test to determine the cause of
an explosion in an oil well, holding that the test conditions were suffi-
ciently similar to allow a logically relevant inference. 6 7
In each of the above cases, courts applied the standard of evidence
to the tests themselves, as contrasted with the Fifth Circuit's applica-
tion of the standard in Muth solely to demonstrative evidence of the
tests. Although other pre-Federal Rules cases applied the substantial
similarity standard to in-court experiments or demonstrations, using
the same rationale as that used for out-of-court tests, there is little if
any analysis whether the same standard ought to apply to both.68 Nor
could any analysis be found, prior to Muth, for permitting oral testi-
mony of the tests relied upon by the experts but excluding demonstra-
tive evidence of those tests. Indeed, if a substantial similarity test
governed both, one would think the court would exclude all evidence of
the tests or let it all in.
2. Post-Federal Rules Cases
Following adoption of the Federal Rules, some courts continued to
treat "experimental evidence" as a discrete category of evidence, with-
out questioning whether such treatment was consistent with the Fed-
eral Rules.6 9 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Harvey
63. Id.
64. 106 N.W. 350 (Iowa 1906).
65. Id. at 351.
66. MARK A. DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF ON DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE § 8.10, at 180 n.7
(1983) (citing Lever Bros. Co. v. Atlas Assur. Co., 131 F.2d 770, 777 (7th Cir.
1942)).
67. Hopkins v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 930, 934 (3d Cir. 1952).
68. See, e.g., Saldania v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 241 F.2d 321, 322 (7th
Cir. 1957); Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1294-95 (3d Cir. 1972).
69. See, e.g., McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1402 (8th Cir. 1994).
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v. General Motors,70 for example, addressed the admissibility of the
,same Malibu tests later at issue in Muth, by continuing to apply the
pre-Federal Rules "experimental evidence" standards:
Where experiments such as this are not based on the facts, however, it must
be made clear to the jury that the evidence is admitted for a limited pur-
pose .... Where, however, an experiment purports to simulate actual events
and to show the jury what presumably occurred at the scene of the accident,
the party introducing the evidence has a burden of demonstrating substantial
similarity of conditions. They may not be identical but they ought to be suffi-
ciently similar so as to provide a fair comparison.
7 1
In Fusco v. General Motors Corp.,72 the plaintiff claimed that the
vehicle lost control and struck a telephone pole because of fatigue fail-
ure of a ball stud in the front suspension.7 3 GM countered that the
ball stud failure was a result, not a cause, of the collision with the
pole. 74 GM's expert conducted a videotaped test to show that if the
stud had broken before the car veered, "there would have been a heavy
black tire mark on the road because the uncontrolled tire would have
dragged as the car slid off course." 75 The trial judge excluded the test,
and the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.76 It characterized the
issue as "interesting and important" and acknowledged that the case
law surrounding such evidence was "muddled."77 It observed:
The concern lies not with use of tape or film (the issue would be largely the
same if the jurors were taken to the test track for a live demonstration) but
with the deliberate recreation of an event under staged conditions. Where
that recreation could easily seem to resemble the actual occurrence, courts
have feared that the jurors may be misled because they do not fully appreciate
how variations in the surrounding conditions, as between the original occur-
rence and the staged event, can alter the outcome. In such cases, the solution
of many courts, including this one, has been to call for substantial similarity
in conditions, or to stress the great discretion of the trial judge to exclude the
evidence where similarity is not shown, or both.
7 8
The First Circuit characterized this rule as a doctrine, "predating
and now loosely appended to Rule 403."79 However, the court did not
explore the relationship between Rule 403 and the substantial simi-
larity standard, tacitly treating them as analogous, if not identical.
Had it looked further, it might have recognized significant differences,
70. 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989).
71. Id. at 1356 (quoting Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1981)). Curi-
ously, the court in Muth did not cite Harvey, even though it addressed the admis-
sibility of one of the same tests excluded in Muth.
72. 11 F.3d 259 (1st Cir. 1993), cited in Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 566
n.20 (5th Cir. 2006).
73. Id. at 260-61.
74. Id. at 261.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 264.
77. Fusco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 263 (1st Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 263-64.
79. Id. at 264. See the text of Rule 403 supra note 8.
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even inconsistencies, between the two.80 The First Circuit's opinion
also attempted to link the substantial similarity standard to the Su,
preme Court's decision in Daubert because Rule 702 imposed a relia-
bility requirement for expert testimony.8 1 Although not expressly
articulated by the court, the implication was that a re-creation of an
accident that was not substantially similar could be excluded as
unreliable.
Historically, many in-court "experiments" were far less elaborate
and scientific than those at issue in Fusco, Harvey, and Muth and did
not necessarily involve experts. In fact, some did not even involve wit-
nesses but, rather, were simply performed by the lawyers and more
akin to Perry Mason-style in-courtroom "stunts." Wright & Graham's
treatise chronicles some real-life extreme examples of these kinds of
courtroom "experiments," which serve "no useful analytic purpose,
[yet] may still function as an excuse for trial judges to take leave of
their senses and attorneys to stretch the ethics of advocacy to the
breaking point."s2 Perhaps the last such notorious in-court demon-
strative experiment was the most disastrous: the Assistant District
Attorney's in-court experiment with the glove that didn't fit during the
O.J. Simpson trial.83
Many of the reported cases arose from attempts by parties to "re-
create" the accident or incident at issue in the case, with varying de-
grees of verisimilitude. The courts treated accident reconstructions or
re-creations with suspicion, and expert testimony to reconstruct or re-
create an accident was itself viewed with substantial skepticism, if not
outright mistrust. Such evidence was variously considered conjec-
tural, speculative, and/or misleading, and judges feared it could in-
vade the province of the jury in resolving disputed facts.8 4
Experimental evidence was also used for a variety of other purposes,
such as to demonstrate that something posited by the proponent was
possible or that something asserted by the adversary was impossible.
For example, such evidence may be used to challenge the non-physical
abilities of witnesses (e.g., to be able to see, hear, or smell)8 5 or to
80. See discussion, infra, Section II.D.2.
81. Fusco, 11 F.3d at 264.
82. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAm, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5172, at 124 (1st ed. 1978).
83. See Roger I. Abrams, The Dance and the Adjudication of Disputes, 51 RUTGERS L.
REV. 901, 908-09 (1999).
84. See, e.g., Logsdon v. Baker, 366 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1973), vacated and re-
manded, 517 F.2d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also, Robert Emmet Burns, The Role
of Reconstruction Experts in Witnessed Accident Litigation, 22 DEPAUL L.J. 7
(1972); Annotation, Admissibility of Opinion Evidence as to Point of Impact or
Collision in Motor Vehicle Accident Case, 66 A.L.R. 2D 1048 (1959).
85. An illustrative example from popular culture is depicted in the classic film, THE
YOUNG PHILADELPHIANS (Warner Bros. 1959), in which the ambitious young tax
lawyer, portrayed by a youthful Paul Newman, turns into a criminal defense law-
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challenge a purportedly common-sense proposition.86 Even after the
Federal Rules were adopted, some courts continued to label such evi-
dence as "experimental evidence" and drew no distinction between the
substantive evidence and the manner in which it was presented.8 7
However, there is a dearth of decisions in which courts have directly
considered whether the pre-Federal Rules treatment of experimental
evidence is appropriate, necessary, or consistent with the Federal
Rules. In short, courts have usually relied on stare decisis rather than
on critical analysis as to whether the case law is consistent with the
Federal Rules.
C. Demonstrative Evidence-Whatever It Is
In Muth, the trial court excluded demonstrative evidence of the
Malibu and CRIS tests but permitted expert testimony about the
tests. In effect, the court imposed a more stringent admissibility
threshold for demonstrative evidence than for other evidence. It is un-
clear why this should be the case. Indeed, there was no explicit dis-
cussion concerning whether the substantial similarity test should
apply at all to demonstrative evidence.
Absent any standards for the admissibility of demonstrative evi-
dence, courts lack clear criteria for determining the proper treatment
of such evidence. Indeed, there is some confusion whether the admis-
sibility threshold for demonstrative evidence ought to be higher or
lower than that for the underlying proposition. For example, al-
though the court in Muth implicitly set a higher standard for demon-
strative evidence, one commentator suggests that demonstrative
evidence is permitted to be used more liberally than other evidence
because it is shown to the jury, but not formally admitted as evidence;
it therefore is not required to meet the higher post-Daubert admissi-
bility standards.8 8
Inconsistent treatment of demonstrative evidence should come as
no surprise. Despite the importance of such evidence in complex mod-
ern trials and the frequency with which it is used, the Federal Rules
contain neither a definition of demonstrative evidence nor any rule
spelling out how a trial court should determine its admissibility or
yer and wins an acquittal in a major murder case by causing a key witness to fail
a test of his ability to differentiate the smell of various liquors.
86. See Note, The Use of Ad Hoc Experimental Evidence in Litigation, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 1064 (1957).
87. See Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1987) (discussing
rules for admission of experimental evidence); see also, Jodoin v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 284 F.3d 272 (1st Cir. 2002); Chase v. Gen. Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17 (4th
Cir. 1988); McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396 (8th Cir. 1994);
Gladhill v. Gen. Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049 (4th Cir. 1984).
88. Carole E. Powell, Note, Computer Generated Visual Evidence: Does Daubert
Make a Difference? 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 577, 584 (1996).
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other use at trial.89 Historically, demonstrative evidence was "not evi-
dence" and the rules did not apply as long as it was not given to the
jury during deliberations.90 The only mention of the subject in the
Federal Rules consists of a passing reference contained in the Advi-
sory Committee Note to Rule 611(a).91 Rule 611(a) gives the court
wide discretion over the mode and order of presentation of evidence at
trial.9 2 However, neither the rule nor the Advisory Committee Note
gives any concrete guidance over how that discretion should be exer-
cised, particularly with respect to demonstrative evidence. Indeed,
the Advisory Committee Note creates the potential for additional con-
fusion because of the absence of a cross-reference to any other rule
that might bear upon the use of demonstrative evidence. 93
Most of the leading publications on the subject of demonstrative
evidence were authored by prominent practitioners, most notably Mel-
vin Belli, rather than legal scholars, 94 and a "concomitant avalanche"
of others as well.95 Such writings popularized demonstrative evidence
rather than analyzed it, and failed to present any "unifying theory ex-
plaining its relevance, admissibility, or use."9 6 One book seriously
discussed the evidentiary rules with respect to a wide variety of types
89. See Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance of Demon-
strative Evidence: Charting its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
957, 960 (1992).
90. See 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §5163, at 35-37 (1st ed. 1978).
91. Id. at 961 n.7, 1017 n. 206. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 611(a) states
that the first subdivision of the rule
covers such concerns as whether testimony shall be in the form of a free
narrative or responses to specific questions, McCormick § 5, the order of
calling witnesses and presenting evidence, 6 Wigmore § 1867, the use of
demonstrative evidence, McCormick § 179, and the many other ques-
tions arising during the course of a trial which can be solved only by the
judge's common sense and fairness in view of the particular
circumstances.
92. Rule 611(a) states:
Control by court.
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses
from harassment or undue embarrassment.
FED. R. EVID. 611(a). See also United States v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1150, 1158 (4th
Cir. 1995).
93. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 611(a) cross-reference Rule 403(b), but
only to the extent of the discretion vested in the judge to exclude evidence "as a
waste of time in Rule 403(b)."
94. See, e.g., MELVIN BELLI, MODERN TRIALS (1954); READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF! A
STORY OF PERSONAL INJURY LAW (1956).
95. See Brain & Broderick, supra note 89, at 999-1000 n.46 (listing sources).
96. Id. at 1002.
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of demonstrative evidence.9 7 But this book said little more than that
the admission of demonstrative evidence is discretionary and that the
use of such evidence is limited by Rule 403. This is not a criticism of
the book but an indication of the lack of clear guidance either in the
Federal Rules or case law.
Scholarly writings are of little additional help. Wright & Graham's
treatise merely suggests that the best that can be done is to recognize
that demonstrative evidence "is both within and without the province
of evidence" and proposes that the courts apply the Federal Rules
"when they supply a workable solution to the problem at hand" and
"resort to other procedural regulations" when the Federal Rules are
"inadequate to cope with the question."98 Unfortunately, it provides
no suggestions for determining when or how the Federal Rules "sup-
ply a workable solution" to a type of evidence they ignore, nor does it
indicate what "procedural regulations" would fill such gaps.
Brain and Broderick's excellent article highlights many of the
problems with the publications of their forebears. They note the ab-
sence of any scholarly theory explaining the relevance of demonstra-
tive evidence, 99 as well as some of the definitional and conceptual
shortcomings of the leading scholarly works on the subject.oo Unfor-
tunately, their article predates Daubert and the subsequent revolution
in expert evidence. However, they do acknowledge the "ever-increas-
ing emphasis in modern trials on lay and expert opinion testimony"
and the resulting fact that "modern lawyers are increasingly turning
to demonstrative evidence to make these opinions understandable to
triers of fact."1O1 They propose a cogent definition of demonstrative
evidence as that which "is principally used to illustrate or explain
other testimonial, documentary, or real proof, or a judicially noticed
fact. It is, in short, a visual (or other sensory) aid."102
A major shortcoming of the existing rules of evidence is a failure to
provide an explicit avenue for the admissibility of demonstrative evi-
dence.' 0 3 Indeed, strictly speaking, such demonstrative evidence ordi-
narily does not prove or disprove facts of consequence and, therefore,
cannot meet the definition of "relevant evidence" under Rule 401.
Thus, Brain and Broderick advocate modifying Rule 401 to provide
97. MARK DOMBROFF, DOMBROFF ON DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE, §§ 1.14-1.15, at 13-
14; § 8.10, at 180-81 (1983). See also Mark A. Dombroff, Innovative Developments
in Demonstrative Evidence Techniques and Associated Problems of Admissibility,
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 139 (1979).
98. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5163, at 37 (1st ed. 1978).
99. Brain & Broderick, supra note 89, at 959-60.
100. Id. at 1004-13.
101. Id. at 964.
102. Id. at 968-69.
103. Id. at 1018.
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additional guidance to the admissibility of demonstrative evidence by
defining "relevant evidence" to include: "(a) evidence having any ten-
dency to make the apparent existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence ... ;" or "(b) evidence
that fairly and accurately explains, illustrates, or clarifies other ad-
missible evidence."1o4 Unfortunately, despite the ever-increasing im-
portance of such evidence, it appears that their recommendations
have been largely ignored by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
and courts.1 0 5
D. Experimental Evidence and the Federal Rules
To some extent, the substantial similarity standard may have
served a function roughly analogous to, albeit less systematic than,
the reliability and relevance standards of the Federal Rules today. Af-
ter all, some older cases justified the substantial similarity standard
in a manner closely tracking the relevancy provisions of Rules 401 and
403.106 Although the Federal Rules do not explicitly define or address
either experimental or demonstrative evidence, some courts have ap-
plied constraints contained in the existing Federal Rules to curtail the
inappropriate use of tests or experiments as demonstrative evidence
by experts.10 7
1. Rule 702
The admissibility of testing performed by expert witnesses is gov-
erned by Rule 702. That rule requires any expert evidence, whether
testimonial or demonstrative, to be based upon sufficient facts or data,
that the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and that the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case.108 In determining reliability under Rule 702,
the Court in DaubertlO9 abandoned the Frye test,1 1 0 a pre-Federal
104. Id. at 1023.
105. But see Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 138 F. Supp.
2d 357, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
106. See e.g., May Dep't Stores Co. v. Runge, 241 F. 575, 579 (8th Cir. 1917) (quoting
Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401, 404 (N.H. 1872)).
107. It should be noted that the evidence codes of many states have diverged from the
Federal Rules by failing to adopt the 2000 Amendments to Rules 701, 702, and
703. As a result, state evidence law may not provide some of the important and
meaningful constraints that, to this writer, now render the substantial similarity
standard superfluous under the Federal Rules. Accordingly, this Article is not
intended to suggest, one way or the other, whether the substantial similarity
standard may still serve a useful purpose under state evidence law.
108. See text of Rule 702, supra note 3.
109. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
110. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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Rules standard for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. The
Court replaced Frye with a nonexclusive list of key factors for courts to
consider in determining the reliability of expert testimony, including
whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested."'
Daubert explicitly stated that "[the Court's] discussion [was] lim-
ited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise
offered here."11 2 In the following decade, lower courts reached differ-
ing conclusions as to whether those criteria applied solely to scientific
testimony, solely to novel scientific testimony, or to all expert testi-
mony.113 However, a few courts quickly concluded that many of the
same hallmarks of reliability should also extend to the testimony of
technical experts. A forceful early example was Stanczyk v. Black &
Decker, Inc.,114 in which the district court excluded the testimony of
an engineer who failed to test his theory about the utility of his pro-
posed guard for a miter saw.115 Judge Zagel illustrated the issue by
contrasting the theories of Seventeenth-Century astronomers Tycho
Brahe and Galileo-Brahe theorizing without attempting to confirm
his theories through observation, and Galileo testing and refuting
long-held beliefs through empirical testing. 116 Judge Zagel therefore
posed the evidentiary question as: "The question before me is whether
plaintiffs expert is a modern version of Tycho Brahe and, if so, does
that mean his testimony ought to be excluded under Daubert ...."117
A series of subsequent Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases held
that, given the importance of testing in the design process of certain
kinds of products, an engineer's failure to test a proposed alternative
design rendered his opinion inadmissible. 1 18 In another case, the
court concluded that the admissibility of an engineer's expert opinions
should be based on considerations such as, "[wihat tests do engineers
use to resolve questions of the kind [this expert] addressed? What
tests should he have performed? What data did he overlook?"119 Pro-
fessor Faigman correctly predicted the ultimate outcome of the issue,
111. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
112. Id. at 590 n. 8. See also id. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("Does all this dicta
apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis of 'technical or other specialized
knowledge'-the other types of expert knowledge to which Rule 702 applies-or
are the 'general observations' limited only to 'scientific knowledge'?").
113. Compare, e.g., Compton v, Subaru of Am., 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996) abro-
gated by Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) and McKendall
v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997) abrogated by Kumho Tire
Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), with Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93
F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1996)..
114. 836 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
115. Id. at 566-67.
116. Id. at 566.
117. Id.
118. Cummins, 93 F.3d at 362.
119. DePaepe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 141 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 1998).
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stating that "[tihe guiding principle. . . must be Daubert's expectation
that hypotheses that can be tested will be tested."120
The Supreme Court finally resolved this question in Kumho, hold-
ing that Daubert requires a "fit" between the expert's reasoning and
conclusions and applies to all technical or other specialized expert tes-
timony-not just scientific evidence. 12 1 In 2000, Kumho's holding was
codified by amending Rule 702 to its current form.12 2
The effect of applying these reliability criteria to technical expert
testimony has been to increase dramatically not only the quantity, but
also the quality of empirical testing by experts. In the years following
the Kumho decision, lower courts generally began exercising greater
scrutiny over the expert testimony of engineers and other technical
experts. 12 3 Although a few courts remained reluctant to require such
testing in all cases in which the expert's opinion was readily testable,
the unmistakable trend has been to the contrary.124 A flurry of recent
cases confirm that, as Professor Feigman asserted over a decade ago,
when an expert's hypothesis can be tested, it ordinarily must be tested
to be admissible.125
Howeverjust as Rule 702 requires experts to test their hypotheses
if possible, it also requires tests to be properly conducted and reliably
120. David L. Faigman, Making the Law Safe for Science: A Proposed Rule for the
Admission of Expert Testimony, 35 WASHBURN L. J. 401, 427 (1996).
121. 526 U.S. 137, 147-49 (1999).
122. FED. R. EVID. 702. See the text of Rule 702, as amended in 2000, supra note 3.
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 amendments stated:
The expert's testimony must be grounded in an accepted body of learning
or experience in the expert's field, and the expert must explain how the
conclusion is so grounded. See, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers,
Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994) ("[W]hether the tes-
timony concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property
valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by refer-
ence to the 'knowledge and experience' of that particular field.").
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
123. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Draining of Daubert and the Recidi-
vism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217,
242-49 (2006).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Winters v. Fru-Con Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2007); Johnson
v. Manitowoc Boom Trucks, Inc., 484 F.3d 426, 430-33 (6th Cir. 2007); Pro Serv.
Automotive, L.L.C. v. Lenan Corp., 469 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 232 F. App'x 780 (10th Cir. 2007); Lum v. Mercedes Benz, U.S.,
L.L.C., No. 3:05CV7191, 2007 WL 1362366, at *3-4 (N.D. Ohio May 7, 2007);
Martinez v. Terex Corp., 241 F.R.D. 631, 638 (D. Ariz. 2007); Rabozzi v. Bombar-
dier, Inc., No. 5:03-CV-1597, 2007 WL 951569, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007);
Solheim Farms, Inc. v. CNH Am., LLC, No. 06-438, 2007 WL 656269, at *3 (D.
Minn. Feb. 28, 2007); Botnick v. Zimmer, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 715, 720-21 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 27, 2007); Schipp v. Gen. Motors Corp., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (E.D. Ark.
2006); Montgomery v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 448 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. Pa.
2006).
[Vol. 86:633
IF THE GLOVE DON'T FIT
applied to the facts of the case. Outside of litigation, engineers are
required to make judgments about whether a test is adequately repre-
sentative of a given set of facts. Likewise, in litigation, courts now
apply Rule 702 to consider whether any dissimilarities between the
test and the accident facts are sufficiently material to the issues in
dispute to require exclusion of the expert's testimony as unreliable. 126
For example, in Kumho's wake, a number of courts have critically as-
sessed the reliability of the analysis of accident reconstructionists and
have excluded speculative or otherwise unreliable expert accident re-
construction evidence under Rule 702.127 Likewise, Rule 702 has been
applied to exclude an expert's tests and the opinions based upon the
tests, where the tests were not shown to be the product of a scientifi-
cally valid methodology.128
2. Rule 403
Rule 403 gives trial courts broad discretion to exclude or restrict
the use of relevant evidence that may be cumulative, misleading, or
unfairly prejudicial.12 9 It does not prevent the use of evidence which
is merely prejudicial; rather, it "protects against evidence that is un-
fairly prejudicial, that is, if it tends to suggest decision on an improper
basis."130 From its inception, Rule 403 was suggested as a restriction
on demonstrative evidence. Professor Schwartz, commenting on the
proposed Federal Rules, remarked that the Rule, then codified as Rule
4-03, might be interpreted as precluding "the more stimulating variety
of real proof' and might therefore be a "cause of concern to advocates
of the benefits of demonstrative evidence." 13 1 In one early example, a
court applied Rule 403 to uphold the exclusion of demonstrative evi-
dence: a chart showing the descent profile of an airliner that crashed
on approach because the chart was misleading for failing to conform to
the stipulated facts. 13 2
126. See, e.g., Hafstienn v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 194 Fed. App'x 209 (5th Cir. 2006);
Topliffv. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, No. 6:04-CV-0297, 2007 WL 911891, at *14-18
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2002).
127. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444-45 (8th Cir.
2001); Hodge v. Soper, 17 F. App'x 196 (4th Cir. 2001); Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-296, 2007 WL 1004313, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2007);
McGee v. Evenflo Co., Inc., No. 5:02-CV-259-4, 2003 WL 23350439 (M.D. Ga.
Dec. 11, 2003), affd, 143 F. App'x 299 (11th Cir. 2005).
128. Schwab v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985-86 (E.D. Mo. 2007).
129. See supra note 8.
130. Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 783 (8th Cir. 1981) citing Carter v. Hewitt, 617
F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980).
131. Victor E. Schwartz, The Proposed Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and Cri-
tique, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 449, 463 n.76 (1969).
132. In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 635
F.2d 67, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Likewise, Rule 403 has been applied to exclude experimental evi-
dence when tests performed by experts were found to be mislead-
ing.133 Indeed, two decades before it decided Muth, the same court
addressed a similar issue involving the use of a crash test and decided
the issue based on Rule 403.134 The court upheld the trial court's ex-
clusion of the film, after the lower court balanced the film's acknowl-
edged relevance against the danger its admission would mislead,
confuse, or prejudice the jury.13 5 The court determined that a limiting
instruction would not defuse such improper influence, concluding that
under Rule 403, the jury would likely consider it as more than a sim-
ple demonstration of general principles.136 The trial court had ex-
cluded rollover crash test films offered by both parties and took the
consistent position that any such films using vehicles other than the
subject model vehicle could be misleading.137 Surprisingly, the court
in Muth did not cite the earlier Fifth Circuit case.
A number of other courts have applied Rule 403 to determine the
admissibility of tests offered to prove the party's theory of an accident,
where the proponent omitted important variables. 138 For example, in
Chase v. General Motors Corp.,1 3 9 the plaintiff alleged that the crash
occurred because of a defect in the braking system; GM countered that
the crash was unavoidable.140 The plaintiff offered tests conducted by
NHTSA and other tests by its own expert to show that, absent a de-
fect, the brakes were capable of stopping the car in time to avoid the
crash.141 However, the tests "were performed in daylight, on flat,
straight surfaces under controlled protocols at test facilities or on an
133. See, e.g., United States v. Gaskell, 985 F.2d 1056, 1061 (11th Cir. 1993); Topliffv.
Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, No. 6:04-CV-0297, 2007 WL 911891, at *14-18
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2007).
134. Shipp v. Gen. Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 427 (5th Cir. 1985).
135. Id.
136. Id. See also Gaskell, 985 F.2d at 1062 ("The ability to cross-examine is not a
substitute for the offering party's burden of showing that a proffered demonstra-
tion or experiment offers a fair comparison to the contested events. Particularly
where the demonstration unfairly tended to prejudice the jury on the one genu-
inely contested issue, without providing any significantly probative testimony,
neither the cautionary instruction nor the ability to cross-examine was sufficient
to cure the error.").
137. Shipp, 750 F.2d at 427 ("A central tenet of GM's argumerit, however, was that all
rollover accidents are different. Yet, its filmed 'accident' was a multiple, rather
than a single revolution one [plaintiffs rollover involved a single roll], involving a
different vehicle with a substantially different roof and passenger compartment
than the TransAm involved in the [plaintiffs accident].").
138. See, e.g., Chase v. Gen. Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1988); Gladhill v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049 (4th Cir. 1984).
139. 856 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1988).
140. Id. at 18.
141. Id. at 18-19.
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airport runway."142 "The tests used experienced drivers at regulated
vehicle speeds and who steered straight ahead." 1 43 "Brake pedal force
in the NHTSA tests was mechanically applied to produce single axle
lock."1 44 "The NHTSA tests were performed on three different surface
types under wet conditions."' 4 5 In the expert's tests, he applied the
brakes himself, "similarly test[ing] the vehicle on both wet and dry
surfaces."14 6
The conditions on the night of the crash were significantly different
from those in the tests. 14 7 The plaintiff "was driving downhill on a
slight curve to the left and was so turning his car at the time of the
accident."'148 "[T]he surface of the road was covered with snow and
ice." 1 49 "Instead of applying measured or pre-ascertained brake pres-
sure, [the plaintiff] instinctively applied the brakes."1 50 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the admissibility issues in a man-
ner that conflated the substantial similarity test with the language of
Rule 403, stating that the conditions of the test "must be sufficiently
close to those involved in the accident at issue to make the probative
value of the demonstration outweigh its prejudicial effect." 15 1 It fur-
ther held that the trial judge should have excluded both the evidence
of the tests themselves, as well as the videotape of the tests. 15 2
In another case, a plaintiff was injured when his vehicle struck a
moose on a highway.' 5 3 The district court excluded a video of an in-
verted drop test of a vehicle similar to the one in which the plaintiff
was injured. 15 4 The plaintiff offered the test to show that the roof of
the vehicle lacked sufficient strength. 1 55 The court found that the test
would be misleading to the jury and was therefore inadmissible under
Rules 701, 702, and 403.156 There was no evidence that the magni-
tude of the forces in the drop test and the moose collision were compa-
rable to each other.' 5 7 The forces imposed during the drop test were
vertical, whereas the vehicle was moving forward when it struck the
142. Id. at 19.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Chase v.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
Gen. Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id.
Chase v. Gen. Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Gladhill v.
Gen. Motors Corp. 743 F.2d 1049, 1052 (4th Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 20 (citing Gladhill, 743 F.2d at 1052).
Brawn v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 187 (D. Me. 1993).
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 188.
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moose. 158 The test protocol indicated that it was designed to assess
roof strength in rollovers, not animal collisions, and the test contained
no performance standard by which to gauge its effectiveness. 159 After
analyzing the published protocol for the test, the court excluded the
tests because of
a high likelihood that the jury would be substantially affected by viewing the
dramatic impact of the crush occurring as a vehicle is dropped on its roof from
a height of 18 inches without gaining any significant understanding concern-
ing what is a safe roof integrity against which to measure what happened
in the plaintiffs collision with the moose. 160 Thus, the court was able
to resolve the admissibility issue by reference to Rules 702 and 403
rather than the substantial similarity standard. Instead, it properly
focused on the specific factors that rendered the test unreliable, irrele-
vant to the issues in the case, misleading, and unfairly
inflammatory.S1
3. Rule 703
Rule 703 permits an expert to render an opinion even if it is based
on inadmissible evidence, as long as the evidence is "of a type reasona-
bly relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject ... "162 This rule can constrain an ex-
pert's demonstrative evidence in two circumstances. First, as a result
of the 2000 amendments to Rule 703, it is now clear that if the expert
reasonably relies on an inadmissible test to reach his or her opinion
(such as one not personally conducted or witnessed by a testifying ex-
pert or any other witness), the test itself is presumptively inadmissi-
158. Brawn v. Fuji Heavy Indus., Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 187, 188 (D. Me. 1993).
159. Id. at 189-90.
160. Id. at 190.
161. Contra Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The sled
test was just similar enough to the Finchums' accident to confuse the jury and
leave jurors with the prejudicial suggestion that the Finchums flipped over back-
wards during the crash."). Finchum, like Muth, tried to merge the substantial
similarity standard with the criteria of Rule 403, without differentiating between
the two.
162. Rule 703 provides:
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for
the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
FED. R. EVID. 703.
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ble. 16 3 Rule 703 permits the expert to render the opinion but does not
permit the expert to bring otherwise inadmissible data into evidence
through the back door unless "the court determines that their proba-
tive value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion sub-
stantially outweighs their prejudicial effect."16 4 Second, if the court
determines that the test was invalid, unreliable, or otherwise was not
"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field," it
can preclude the expert's opinion altogether, not simply the test.
165
In Muth, the court might have excluded evidence of the Malibu and
CRIS tests under Rule 703 if the testifying expert did not participate
in or have personal knowledge of the tests, but there is no indication
that the parties or the court were concerned about demonstrative evi-
dence of the tests being used as "backdoor hearsay" contrary to the
limitations of Rule 703.166 The Muth opinion gives no indication that
the parties contended, or that the court determined, that the tests
were not "of a type reasonably relied upon" by experts. Indeed, the
opinion implies that the experts were permitted to testify about the
tests and were merely precluded from showing any test films or photo-
graphs to the jury.16 7
163. Under earlier law, some courts interpreted Rule 703 to allow the expert to dis-
close hearsay "for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for his expert opin-
ion." Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 1984).
Also compare Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony,
39 VAND. L. REV. 577, 585-86 (1986) ("To protect against litigation based on un-
sworn allegations contained in the report of a nontestifying expert, it may be time
to consider careful revision of Federal Evidence Rule 703.") with Paul R. Rice,
Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to
Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 584 (1987) ("[T]he introduction of the
inadmissible facts or data upon which experts rely no more violates the hearsay
rule's spirit than do the volumes of evidence that regularly are introduced
through the numerous hearsay rule exceptions.").
164. Id. See United States v. Leason, 453 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding
determination that probative value of hearsay relied upon by expert substantially
outweighed prejudicial effect); Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 338
F.3d 1058, 1062 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding exclusion of hearsay relied upon by
expert because its probative value did not outweigh its prejudicial effect).
165. FED. R. EVID. 703.
166. But see Montgomery v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 448 F. Supp. 2d 619, 633 (E.D.
Pa. 2006) (testifying expert could offer an opinion based on tests conducted by a
non-testifying expert, but this did not necessarily mean that evidence of the tests
themselves would be admissible as evidence at trial); see also Mike's Train House,
Inc., v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 409 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the testify-
ing expert's statements regarding conclusions derived from tests conducted by a
non-testifying expert were inadmissible as hearsay).
167. Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 2006).
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4. Rule 701168
Because so many of the recent cases arise from evidence of tests
performed by experts, it is easy to overlook the fact that experimental
evidence can be offered by lay witnesses as well. Indeed, many of the
older cases arise from testimony of lay witnesses who "tested" some
aspect of a party's theory. 16 9 Therefore, even if Rule 702's reliability
requirements obviate the necessity of retaining the substantial simi-
larity standard for experts, one might argue that it is still necessary
because of the risk that experiments by lay witnesses could be used to
circumvent those requirements.
Whatever merit such a concern might have had in the past, it is
superfluous today. The 2000 amendment to Rule 701 adds the proviso
that testimony offered under Rule 701 is not "based on scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702."170
This amendment was intended to make clear that Rule 701 should not
be used to evade Rule 702. Indeed, even before the 2000 amendments,
one circuit had reached a similar conclusion under the earlier version
of Rule 701.171 The commentary and case law surrounding Rule 701
now protect against the use of lay witnesses to obtain admission of
otherwise unreliable or prejudicial experiments or tests.' 7 2
Furthermore, the "helpfulness" requirement of Rule 701(b) limits
the improper use of tests and demonstrations by lay witnesses. If a
jury can look at the same evidence considered by the lay witness and
168. Rule 701 provides:
Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses.
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
FED. R. EVID. 701.
169. See, e.g., May Dep't Stores v. Runge, 241 F. 575 (8th Cir. 1917); see also discus-
sion supra Section II.B.1.
170. FED. R. EVID. 701 advisory committee's note.
171. Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1193 (3d Cir. 1990).
172. Sachs v. Reef Aquaria Design, Inc. 2007 WL 3223336, *11 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25,
2007) (Testimony by defendant engineer regarding the "accepted custom and
practice in the field" was expert opinion testimony under Rule 702, not lay opin-
ion testimony under 701, and therefore subject to the expert disclosure require-
ments of FRCP 26(a)(2)(A).); EdgeCo. Inc. v. FastCap, LLC, No. CUV, A,
02-2624(JAG), 2005 WL 1630836, at *20 (D.N.J. July 11, 2005) (addressing a lay
witness who attempted to circumvent Rule 702 by offering evidence of tests under
Rule 701; court held that Rule 702 requirements apply); see also, United States v.
Sickles, No. 1:06CR36, 2006 WL 3375365, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. Nov. 21, 2006) (dis-
cussing the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 amendments to Rule 701).
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reach its own conclusions, the court may exclude as unhelpful the lay
opinion of a witness not qualified as an expert. 173
E. Substantial Similarity: The Goldilocks Principle?
Continued use of the substantial similarity standard for experi-
mental evidence is no longer necessary in light of the foregoing Fed-
eral Rules, as they have been interpreted and applied. As already
pointed out, Rule 702 requires that experts test their testable hypoth-
eses, that the court act as a gatekeeper to ensure the reliability of the
test method employed by the expert, 1 74 and that the court determine
that the opinions are derived reliably from the facts. 175 Rule 403 en-
ables the court to exclude or otherwise limit relevant evidence if its
relevance is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice,176 confusion of the issues, 177 or is misleading17S or cumula-
tive, 179 and Rule 703 presumptively excludes backdoor hearsay upon
which the expert relied. If any additional legitimate purpose is served
by superimposing a substantial similarity requirement on demonstra-
tive evidence that is otherwise reliable and relevant, the cases have
failed to identify it. Instead, some courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in
Muth, persist in applying the substantial similarity standard-as
though "experimental evidence" were still a discrete category of evi-
dence in need of a special unwritten rule.
Even though the substantial similarity standard is an artifact of
the pre-Federal Rules case law, some might argue that it is a harmless
one. After all, of what relevance is a courtroom test that is not sub-
stantially similar to the case at issue? As it turns out, there are at
least five reasons that continued use of such a standard is not a harm-
less error.
1. Distraction from More Appropriate Standards
The substantial similarity standard can distract the court from the
analysis it ought to conduct under Rules 401, 403, 702, 703, and 105.
It has led to less nuanced and more arbitrary exercises of the court's
discretion, such as a blanket rule to exclude all tests involving differ-
ent model vehicles, 1s0 or a decision to exclude all demonstrative test-
173. See U.S. Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d
1322, 1333 (S.D. Ala. 2003).
174. Schwab v. Nissan N. Am., 502 F. Supp. 2d 980, 982 (E.D. Mo. 2007).
175. Id. at 985 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
176. United States v. Gaskell, 985 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1993).
177. Daskarolis v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 651 F.2d 937, 940 (4th Cir. 1981).
178. Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir. 1995).
179. Mittlieder v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 441 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1971).
180. Shipp v. Gen. Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1985).
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ing evidence.1S1 Once a judge concludes that a test constitutes some
kind of re-creation of the accident and makes a finding that the test is,
or is not, substantially similar, no other findings are necessary; subse-
quently, the appellate court, applying an abuse of discretion standard
of review, upholds the trial court's ruling without further scrutiny.
Because the standard is not based on any of the Federal Rules, liti-
gants and courts are left in a quandary deciding whether it supplants
applicable provisions of the Federal Rules or, if not, how it fits within
those provisions.
By contrast, under Rules 403, 611, and 105, the court can-and
should-consider the degree to which such evidence is likely to cause
confusion, open up time-wasting collateral issues, produce such a
strong visceral response in jurors that it could overwhelm their objec-
tivity, or whether the dissimilarities are explainable. These rules also
give the court latitude to consider how much of the evidence to admit,
which portions to exclude, and whether the potentially misleading ef-
fect of dissimilarities can be alleviated by cautionary instructions. For
example, in Harvey v. General Motors Corp., the court held that it was
proper to admit the test videos, but gave a cautionary instruction that
the videos did not purport to "re-create" the accident and that the jury
should be cognizant of the differences between the conditions of the
test and those of the accident.18 2 This was consistent with the Advi-
sory Committee Note to Rule 403, which states that, in deciding
"whether to exclude on grounds of prejudice, consideration should be
181. Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557 (5th Cir. 2006).
182. 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989). The trial court gave the following cautionary
instruction before permitting defendant to show the test films to the jury:
THE COURT: Members of the jury, there will now be displayed to you
Defendant's Exhibit DD-2. In viewing this film, the Court has admitted
it because it thinks that it would be helpful to you in understanding the
oral testimony of Mr. Orlowski as well as the general principles of vehi-
cle dynamics and occupant kinematics in patterns of injury mechanics to
which Mr. Orlowski has testified.
But let me point out to you and instruct you that this involves a
Chevrolet Impala with a solid roof, not a 1978 T-top Corvette, and you
are not to ignore the distinctions between this demonstrative evidence
and the actual event that is the subject matter of this action. You must
make allowances for the differences between the actual event and the
demonstrative evidence.
Id. at 1355.
See also Champeau v. Fruehauf Corp., 814 F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1987)
(upholding admission of videotape of experiment with stipulation identifying the
similarities and differences between experimental conditions and those involved
in the accident); Mark Dombroff, Innovative Developments in Demonstrative Evi-
dence Techniques and Associated Problems of Admissibility, 45 J. AIR LAW &
COM. 139, 146 (1979) (discussing a cautionary instruction used in admitting a
model of an airport in a trial arising from an air crash disaster).
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given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting
instruction."18 3
In Muth, although the Fifth Circuit alluded to the potentially mis-
leading nature of the tests, it decided the case without any explicit
analysis of any of the applicable rules of evidence. With one insignifi-
cant exception, the Fifth Circuit's entire discussion of the inadmissi-
bility of the Malibu and CRIS tests failed even to cite any Federal
Rule.18 4 Muth is not an isolated case in this regard; numerous other
federal cases have failed to cite a single Federal Rule of Evidence
when applying the substantial similarity standard.18 5
2. Vagueness of "Substantial Similarity"
Given the impossibility of conducting a test that is identical to the
accident, how can courts make reasoned and logically consistent judg-
ments about how similar a test must be in order to be "substantially
similar"? The terminology of substantial similarity is so vague as to
permit disregard of significant dissimilarities or to rationalize exclu-
sion of tests based on trivial differences.18 6 How else to account for
the fact that two courts reached precisely the opposite conclusion on
183. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5211 at 244 (1st ed. 1978). See also supra text accompanying note
136.
184. The sole reference was a footnote citation to a quotation from Shipp v. General
Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 428 (5th Cir. 1985), which offers the conclusory opin-
ion: "So viewed and so weighed on the Rule 403 scale, there was no error." Muth,
461 F.3d at 566 n.18.
185. See, e.g., McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396 (8th Cir. 1994); Chase
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1988); Gladhill v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
743 F.2d 1049 (4th Cir. 1984). But see Jodoin v. Toyota Motor Corp., 284 F.3d
272, 278 (1st Cir. 2002).
186. Compare Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226, 1233-34 (8th Cir. 1982) ("A
court may properly admit experimental evidence if the tests were conducted
under conditions substantially similar to the actual conditions. Admissibility,
however, does not depend on perfect identity between actual and experimental
conditions. Ordinarily, dissimilarities affect the weight of the evidence, not its ad-
missibility.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted) with Gilbert v. Cosco Inc., 989
F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[E]xperiments which purport to recreate an acci-
dent must be conducted under conditions similar to that accident, while experi-
ments which demonstrate general principles used in forming an expert's opinion
are not required to adhere strictly to the conditions of the accident.") (emphasis
supplied). See also Sharon Panian, Comment, Truth, Lies, and Videotape: Are
Current Federal Rules of Evidence Adequate?, 21 S.W. L. REV. 1199, 1210 (1992)
(advocating that videotaped experiments should be admitted only when per-
formed under conditions "substantially identical" to the incident in question). But
see Jodoin v. Toyota Motor Corp., 284 F.3d 272, 279 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing
trial court which required that the vehicle being tested be "virtually identical"
with accident vehicle). But see In re Jacoby Airplane Crash Litigation, 2007 WL
3243920, *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2007) (distinguishing between a demonstration that
"recreates" the accident and one that is offered to "illustrate" the expert's
opinion).
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the admissibility of the same test in the same kind of case? The same
Malibu test video, excluded in Muth, was admitted in Harvey, 18 7 even
though both cases presented rollover product liability claims based on
allegations of inadequate roof strength. The imprecision of the term,
"substantially similar," is compounded by the broad discretion appel-
late courts afford the trial court in making its determination.18 8
No doubt, similarities and dissimilarities between a test and the
actual conditions can be important in determining the reliability of
the test under Rule 702, the relevance of the test under Rule 401, and
the degree to which the test may be unfairly prejudicial or misleading
under Rule 403. But, even though dissimilarities are a part of the
analysis, no one can seriously argue that they should comprise the
entire analysis.
A better analytical framework would include: 1) identification of
the particular ways in which the test is similar and dissimilar to the
events at issue; 2) the materiality of the dissimilarities;18 9 3) whether
the dissimilarities are significant enough to render the test unreliable
or not probative of any issue in dispute; 4) whether any of the dissimi-
larities are unfairly prejudicial and incapable of explanation or miti-
gation via cautionary instructions and cross examination; 190 5)
whether the test appears to be the "best evidence" (i.e., the availability
(or lack thereof) of alternate test methodologies or protocols more reli-
able, more probative, and less likely to mislead the finder of fact);19 1
6) whether the jury is more likely to be misled by the test, with its
dissimilarities, than by evidence devoid of any testing at all; and 7)
whether the proponent is attempting to oversell the test as proving
more than it actually does. It is noteworthy that all of these consider-
ations fall within the parameters of Rules 401, 403, 105, 702, and 703.
187. Harvey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1989).
188. See United States v. Rackley, 742 F.2d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 1984); Wagner v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224, 232 (8th Cir. 1979). The difficulty is further
compounded by the fact that the terminology "substantial similarity" is used in a
variety of other contexts. See, e.g., Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Co., 847 F.2d
1261, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1988); Brooks v. Chrysler Corp., 786 F.2d 1191, 1195
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (admissibility of other incidents in product liability case); Arica
Inst. Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992) (proof of infringement in copy-
right case); In re Lesker, 939 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1991) (classification of creditor
claims in Chapter 13 bankruptcy).
189. See Jodoin v. Toyota Motor Corp., 284 F.3d 272, 280 (lst Cir. 2002) (giving exam-
ples from prior cases to illustrate its conclusion that "[w]hen the relevant ele-
ments are sufficiently similar," other dissimilarities can be adequately dealt with
in cross examination) (emphasis added).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 182 and 183.
191. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5211 at 244 (1st ed. 1978) (quoting FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory com-
mittee's note: "The availability of other means of proof may also be an appropri-
ate factor.")).
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3. False Dichotomy between "Re-Creations" and "Abstract
Principles"
The substantial similarity standard creates a false, black-and-
white dichotomy between tests offered to "re-create" the accident in
question and those offered to show an abstract principle. The best ju-
dicial solution to the evidentiary dispute should be calibrated to ac-
commodate both the probative value of the evidence and exclude or
limit the portion of it that is misleading or unfairly prejudicial. The
Federal Rules, particularly Rules 403 and 105, provide avenues for
doing this; the substantial similarity standard does not.
Moreover, in some cases, there is a continuum rather than a bright
line between the "re-creations" and "demonstrations of abstract princi-
ples." In such cases, the test at issue is susceptible to a characteriza-
tion as fitting into either category, or both. Tests often shed light on
abstract and case-specific questions alike, as appears to have been the
case with the Malibu and CRIS tests in Muth. The legal inquiry
should not turn on whether the admissibility prize is to be found be-
hind Curtain A or Curtain B. The Federal Rules make no distinction
between abstract and case-specific tests. Rather, they require the
court to assess the reliability and relevance of the test and to weigh
the probative value against the prejudicial effect.
The substantial similarity standard, unlike the Federal Rules, pro-
vides no guideposts for resolving a situation in which a test would be
admissible to prove an abstract proposition but inadmissible as a re-
creation. By contrast, Federal Rule 105 provides that evidence which
is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another may be ad-
mitted with appropriate instructions as to its limited purpose. 19 2 The
permissive language of Rule 105, read in conjunction with Rule 403,
suggests that such evidence should be admitted for a limited purpose,
with appropriate limiting instructions, unless the court determines
that its unfairly prejudicial impact could not be alleviated by instruc-
tions and that the prejudice substantially outweighs whatever proba-
tive value the evidence might have. That sensible flexibility is
obscured by the all-or-nothing substantial similarity standard.
4. Exclusion of Demonstrations that are "Too Similar"
If an expert conducts a test in a case in which there are disputed
facts, which party's version of the facts should the expert be permitted
192. Rule 105 states:
Limited Admissibility
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but
not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted,
the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope
and instruct the jury accordingly.
FED. R. EvID. 105.
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to rely upon when establishing the test parameters? For example, if
defense witnesses claim that the plaintiffs vehicle was traveling at 60
miles per hour, and plaintiffs witnesses claim she was traveling 30
miles per hour, then at what speed should the expert run the test?
There is no good reason that testing should be considered by the jury
only when all parties agree on all material facts. Furthermore, al-
though it may be tactically advantageous to run a test based on the
opposing party's version of events, there is no good reason that admis-
sibility of one party's testing should necessarily be governed by adher-
ence to the opposing party's version of disputed facts.
However, Muth held that the trial court had discretion to deem
Ford's CRIS test as "prejudicial" because the test's similarities with
Ford's theory of the accident meant that the test sought to recreate
the accident rather than demonstrate an abstract scientific princi-
ple.193 In other words, because the test might be perceived as a re-
creation in some respect, it was inadmissibly misleading because it
was too similar.194 Such reasoning leads to a nonsensical analysis be-
cause any demonstration of any abstract principle is subject to the
same attack as long as the abstract principle has enough overlap with
the facts of the disputed accident to be relevant at all. That the CRIS
test offered in Muth was consistent with the evidence made the test
more probative, not more prejudicial, than if the test had been con-
ducted in a manner wholly unrelated to any version of the facts. In a
case arising from the rollover of a Ford Crown Victoria, can one seri-
ously argue that a rollover test involving a Volkswagen Beatle would
be better than one using a similar Crown Victoria?
Such logic, if followed to its logical end, leads to the anomalous con-
clusion that a test offered to demonstrate an abstract proposition is
potentially inadmissible whenever it is substantially similar in any
respect. 19 5 Thus, if a plaintiff was injured by a 20-pound object falling
193. Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 567 (5th Cir. 2006).
194. Id.
195. It also presupposes that demonstration of an abstract principle is incapable of
being inflammatory, misleading, or unfairly prejudicial. For example, in Wilson
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322, 1331 (Or. 1978), the Court stated:
[Tihe character of the film itself was such that it ought not to have been
shown to the jury. Entitled "Restraints for Survival," the film was obvi-
ously intended, and is undoubtedly very effective, as an emotional as
well as a factual appeal for the increased use of upper torso restraints for
aircraft occupants. The facts and conclusions expressed by the narrator
were emphasized in various ways, including the liberal use of dramatic
music, repeated views of what appears to be a dead body beside the
wreckage of a small airplane, and closeups of dummies used in test
crashes, their faces smeared with red to simulate blood. Whatever its
merits for other purposes, this film was totally out of place in this trial.
Any probative value it had which was not merely cumulative of Dr. Sny-
der's testimony was outweighed by its frank appeal to the emotions of its
audience.
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from a bridge and her expert sought to demonstrate Galileo's test of
dropping objects of different weights from the Tower of Pisa, the court
could arguably exclude such a demonstration on the basis that one of
the objects weighed nearly the same as the object in the actual acci-
dent, or that they were dropped from a similar height, or that they
were shaped similarly, or that they were the same color, or that they
were both made of rock. Conversely, the substantial similarity stan-
dard is sufficiently nebulous to permit the court to exclude such a test,
offered to re-create the accident, merely because the plaintiff was in-
jured by falling granite and the expert used marble. Had the court
applied the Federal Rules, rather than the court-created dichotomy
between "abstract principles" and "re-creations," it could have ad-
dressed whether the test was actually unfairly prejudicial to the
proponent.
5. Shifting of the Foundational Burden
The substantial similarity standard confuses the question of which
party should bear the foundational burden to establish admissibility.
Under the Federal Rules, the proponent of expert testimony has the
burden of showing that the evidence is relevant and reliable under
Rule 702.196 Once the proponent satisfies that burden, the objecting
party has the burden of showing that the probative value of the evi-
dence is "substantially outweighed" by various prejudicial factors.197
By contrast, the substantial similarity standard, as articulated by the
Tenth Circuit and generally followed by federal courts since then,
places the entire burden on the proponent. 198
Too often, courts prefer to justify decisions based on old case law,
even when the statute or rule governing the issue has changed in the
interim. This is such a case. Common-law rules of exclusion should
not generally trump the Federal Rules, but courts often struggle in
such situations. For example, courts have reached differing conclu-
sions as to whether the common-law collateral source rule divests the
trial court of discretion to admit such evidence under Rule 403.199
The Federal Rules themselves explicitly shift the burden to the propo-
nent to show the absence of unfair prejudice in a few exceptional cir-
196. Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
197. United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 164 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
403).
198. Jackson v. Fletcher, 647 F.2d 1020, 1027 (10th Cir. 1981).
199. Compare, e.g., Sheehy v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., Inc., 631 F.2d 649, 652 (9th Cir.
1980) (indicating that Rule 403 would not allow the trial discretion in this situa-
tion due to common-law collateral source principles), with Savoie v. Otto Candies,
Inc., 692 F.2d 363, 371 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that discretion arises by way of
Rule 403).
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cumstances. 20 0 Unfortunately, the courts' reflexive application of the
substantial similarity standard has pretermitted any analysis of
whether the Rules' silence with respect to experimental evidence
should somehow shift the burden of showing unfair prejudice under
Rule 403.
The Tenth Circuit's allocation of the burden for experimental evi-
dence did not result from any analysis of any provision in the Federal
Rules.20 1 The court justified shifting the foundational burden to the
proponent simply by citing an older Tenth Circuit case, Navajo
Freight Lines v. Mahaffy, which stated, "'A party offering evidence of
out of court experiments must lay a proper foundation by showing a
similarity of circumstances and conditions."' 20 2 Neither Jackson nor
Navajo Freight Lines considered whether its analysis was consistent
with the Federal Rules. Rather, Navajo Freight Lines cited old cases
that predated modern federal discovery and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Understandably, these old cases made no distinction between
the burden of showing relevance and reliability and the burden of
showing unfair prejudice. Indeed, the only case cited in Navajo
Freight Lines that squarely addressed the issue, a 1906 case from a
Florida state court, said that evidence of experiments "should be re-
ceived with caution, and only be admitted when it is obvious to the
court, from the nature of the experiments, that the jury will be en-
lightened, rather than confused." 20 3 It held that
[elvidence of an experiment whereby to test the truth of testimony that a cer-
tain thing occurred is not admissible, where the conditions attending the al-
leged occurrence and the experiment are not shown to be similar. The
similarity of circumstances and conditions go to the admissibility of the evi-
dence, and must be determined by the court. 2 0 4
Rule 403, unlike the 1906 Florida case relied on by the Tenth Cir-
cuit, shifts the burden to the opponent. It authorizes exclusion only if
the probative value of the evidence is "substantially outweighed" by
its prejudicial effect and requires the objecting party to carry the bur-
200. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 703; see also, United States v. Curtin, No. 04-10632, 2007
WL 1500295, at *8 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007); B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d
1091, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the relationship between Rule 412(b)(2)
and Rule 403); Lesko v. Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 61-62 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing the
relationship between Rule 404(b) and Rule 403).
201. Jackson, 647 F.2d at 1027.
202. Id. (quoting Navajo Freight Lines v. Mahaffy, 174 F.2d 305, 310 (10th Cir.
1949)).
203. Hisler v. State, 42 So. 692, 695 (Fla. 1906).
204. Id. Navajo Freight Lines, 174 F.2d at 310, also cited a 1936 California state ap-
pellate court decision which held that "it must always be first shown whether
circumstances are similar or so similar as to render result of experiments illus-
trative of the questions under consideration," but that case did not discuss
whether the proponent's burden also extended to questions relating to the preju-
dicial impact of such experiments. Collins v. Graves, 61 P.2d 1198, 1203 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1936).
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den of showing prejudice. 20 5 The courts have given no reason why the
burden of showing prejudice should be different for testing evidence
than for other kinds of evidence.
There might well have been reasons for imposing the entire burden
on the proponent a century ago, when the Florida court announced
such a rule. At that time, without pretrial discovery and expert disclo-
sure requirements, the proponent could ambush the other party with
an experiment. It undoubtedly seemed more sensible to make the pro-
ponent shoulder the entire foundational burden than to require the
opponent to respond to the evidentiary ambush. Of course, the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure have long since eliminated trial by am-
bush, and the detailed expert disclosures,20 6 expert depositions, 20 7
motions in limine, 20 8 and fact discovery available today render any
such concern obsolete. 20 9
In short, Muth exemplifies the shortcomings of the substantial
similarity standard and demonstrates why the First Circuit in Fusco
was right in describing the existing state of the law as "muddled."210
The trial court in Muth rejected the tests Ford offered as "not quite
similar enough," yet too similar.211 The court expressed concern that
the CRIS test would be confused with the subject accident because the
test vehicle's rotational speed and principal point of impact were con-
sistent with the opinions of Ford's experts, not plaintiff's experts.
2 12
Furthermore, the vehicles used in the CRIS test were the same vehicle
model (Ford Crown Victoria) as that involved in the case, albeit a
newer model year.2 13 According to the Fifth Circuit, this arguably
made the CRIS test too similar to the accident facts.2 14 But if this was
the court's concern, then how could it justify also excluding the video
of the Malibu test, which was conducted using a completely different
205. United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148 (1st Cir. 2004).
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
207. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
208. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 (1984).
209. In an analogous vein, in Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655 (11th Cir. 1988),
the court questioned the need to continue to observe the common-law rule that a
when party fails to produce a witness under its control, the jury may infer that
the testimony of the witness would be unfavorable. Because modern federal pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules enable discovery of witnesses employed by the op-
posing party and no longer require a party to "vouch" for the witnesses it calls to
testify, the Eleventh Circuit questioned the wisdom of permitting the missing
witness charge when the potential witness was within the subpoena power of
both parties and physically available to be called. Id. at 659 n.4.
210. Fusco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 263-64 (1st Cir. 1993).
211. Muth v. Ford Motor Co., 461 F.3d 557, 566 (5th Cir. 2006).
212. Id. at 567.
213. The published report of the CRIS tests indicates that they used 1998-2000 Ford
Victorias. Moffatt, supra note 14. The vehicle in Muth was a 1996 Crown Victo-
ria. Muth, 461 F.3d at 560.
214. Muth, 461 F.3d at 567.
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model vehicle, and using a test device that imposed no forward veloc-
ity at all? The court might have reasoned that the Malibu test was
"not similar enough," although it did not say this, but the court did not
analyze the admissibility of the two tests separately. If the court's
holding-that the tests were "too similar yet not similar enough"-
sounds like the porridge tasted by Goldilocks, it is. The substantial
similarity standard employed by the court makes it impossible for a
litigant to determine in advance what test, if any, is "just right."
Finally, the court in Muth distinguished between the admissibility
of the tests themselves and photographs and video of those tests. The
trial court excluded the latter but not the former. No one contested
that the video and photographs helped the jury understand the gen-
eral dynamics involved in rollover accidents; that they illustrated
Ford's claim that, during rollovers, head and neck injuries can occur
prior to roof deformation. 2 15 It is unclear from the opinion whether
plaintiff ever objected to the tests as unreliable. However, if the court
was applying the substantial similarity standard consistently, it
should have excluded all evidence of testing, not just the demonstra-
tive evidence. Indeed, if the court had applied the Federal Rules, the
trial court probably would have excluded evidence of the tests alto-
gether had it found the tests to be unreliable or irrelevant. But the
trial court apparently made no such determination, because it permit-
ted the jury to hear the opinions of Ford's expert but not to see any of
what the court characterized dismissively as "his visual aids."2 16
Undoubtedly, there may be circumstances under which a court
should admit evidence of the test but exclude the demonstrative evi-
dence. But such a decision could be made more rationally if based
explicitly upon application of Rules 403, 611(a), 703, and 105 rather
than the substantial similarity standard.
F. A Modest Proposal: Apply the Rules
As previously suggested, the Federal Rules of Evidence already
provide the necessary tools for assessing the admissibility of experi-
mental evidence. They offer a more detailed and systematic methodol-
ogy for identification and analysis of the pertinent issues relating to
such evidence. Muth presents an excellent example of the reasons
that the substantial similarity standard can distract courts and liti-
gants from analyzing the issues appropriately. It also highlights the
need to make clear that the Federal Rules can and should apply to
demonstrative evidence, just as with other kinds of evidence. Thus, as
with other kinds of evidence, the methodology for admissibility of de-
215. Id. at 566-67.
216. Id.
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monstrative evidence of testing should be to follow the applicable Fed-
eral Rules systematically by considering:
1) Whether the proponent has demonstrated that the tests were
reliable and relevant under Rules 702 and 401. In the case of
demonstrative evidence, "relevant" ought to be understood to
mean that they fairly and accurately explain, illustrate, or clar-
ify, other admissible evidence. 21 7
2) If reliable and relevant, whether the objecting party has shown
that the relevance is substantially outweighed by the dangers of
unfair prejudice set forth in Rule 403.
3) If the tests are dissimilar in some fashion from the accident,
whether the dissimilarities are material. Can the effect of these
dissimilarities be alleviated by cautionary instructions, or is the
test likely to confuse the real issues of the case or to evoke a
visceral response in jurors that cannot be effectively overcome
by cautionary instructions and vigorous cross examination?
4) Whether the demonstrative evidence is being used to bring in
evidence otherwise inadmissible under Rule 703, and, if so,
whether the proponent has shown that the probative value of
such evidence in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opin-
ion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects.
Reconciliation of the applicable provisions of the Federal Rules
with a common-law standard that predates the Federal Rules is a
well-defined process. Rule 402 declares that "[a]ll relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority."218
It follows that common-law evidentiary decisions do not trump the
Federal Rules.
Daubert presents a case in point. Some courts continued to apply
Frye even after adoption of the Federal Rules. 21 9 In Daubert, the Su-
preme Court was asked to reconcile the pre-Federal Rules Frye test
with Rule 702.220 The Court noted that the legislatively-enacted Fed-
eral Rules should be interpreted in the same manner as any stat-
ute.2 21 Citing United States v. Abel,222 the Court concluded that "the
Rules occupy the field," but that "the common law nevertheless could
217. Brain & Broderick, supra note 89, at 923.
218. United States v. Curtin, No. 04-10632, 2007 WL 1500295, at *7 (9th Cir. May 24,
2007) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 402).
219. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
220. Id. at 587.
221. Id. (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)).
222. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
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serve as an aid to their application." 22 3 The Court contrasted the situ-
ation in which the common-law rule was "entirely consistent" with the
provision in the Federal Rules, and one in which the Court "was una-
ble to find a particular common-law doctrine in the Rules."2 24 In the
former situation, the body of law contained in the common-law deci-
sions could continue to provide a source of guidance; in the latter, the
common-law rule was "superseded."2 25 Because nothing in the Fed-
eral Rules incorporated the Frye test and because there was no indica-
tion that the Federal Rules as a whole or any specific rule was
intended to incorporate it, the assertion that the Federal Rules were
intended to "assimilate" the Frye test was "unconvincing."2 26 Accord-
ingly, the Court abandoned Frye and, instead, established a new stan-
dard consistent with the language and purposes of the Federal
Rules. 227
The same analysis ought to lead to a similar conclusion as to the
substantial similarity standard for experimental evidence. The sub-
stantial similarity standard is found nowhere in the Federal Rules,
and the Rules provide no basis for continuing to treat experimental
evidence as a discrete category of evidence. The reliability, relevance,
and prejudice provisions of the Federal Rules encompass the issues
raised by such evidence. It follows that, as with Frye, the pre-Federal
Rules substantial similarity standard should give way to the stan-
dards already incorporated within the Rules.
III. CONCLUSION
The substantial similarity standard for evidence of tests, like the
Frye standard, is an artifact of pre-Federal Rules evidence law. Char-
acterizing such evidence as "experimental," like Frye's treatment of
"novel scientific" evidence, should no longer trigger special rules of ad-
missibility. In a post-Kumho world, the artifacts of common-law "ex-
perimental" evidence should not continue to confuse, let alone
preempt, the relevance, reliability and prejudice criteria of the Fed-
eral Rules. Undoubtedly, the Rules would benefit from clarification of
the standards for admissibility of demonstrative evidence, in order to
223. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88.
224. Id. at 588.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 589.
227. Another example of a common-law evidence rule supplanted by the Federal Rules
of Evidence is the doctrine of res gestae. F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 45
F.3d 969, 979 (5th Cir. 1995). This "obsolete" doctrine was described by other
federal courts as "useless, harmful, and almost inescapable of a definition." Ste-
phens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1003 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Williams v. Melton, 733
F.2d 1492, 1494 (11th Cir. 1984); Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19, 23 n.l
(D.C. Cir. 1953)) (en banc).
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bring the evidence more clearly under the umbrella of the existing
rules, such as was proposed by Brain & Broderick.
Dean Wigmore got it mostly right long ago, when he defined the
issue as follows:
[Wihether data whose relevance is not questioned are objectionable or inferior
because they have been obtained, not by observing merely such casual mate-
rial as nature has provided for us, but by carefully arranging the conditions so
as to obtain by experiment trustworthy results. That there should be such a
distinction between observation and experiment would be unworthy of our
law.2 2 8
Today's Federal Rules no longer require an act of faith that the
expert has "carefully arranged" conditions to produce "trustworthy re-
sults." The Rules provide ample opportunity, in advance of trial, to
gauge the reliability of the test, to decide whether it "fits" the issues of
the case, whether it is probative of a material issue, and whether its
relevance is substantially outweighed by a variety of prejudicial fac-
tors. If these rules are properly applied, an amorphous substantial
similarity standard is obsolete. Because it can distract from the stan-
dards for admissibility set forth in the Federal Rules, substantial sim-
ilarity should no longer be employed as the litmus test for
admissibility of experimental evidence.
228. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 445 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1979).
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